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the best products, guarantees fair dealing and offers the best facilities
for the public comfort will benefit. The companies will still be able to
train retail dealers in courtesy and efficiency. But instead of compulsion
being the sanction for the continuance of the relationship, the oil companies will compete vigorously for the business of the retail operators.
And the resultant smaller competitive unit at the retail level could establish a type of competition that some have implied is inconsistent with
our ologopolistic economy. 60 For those who believe our free enterprise
system is adaptive enough to allow the co-existence of efficient bigness,
where necessary, and individualistic smallness, the result would be
eminently satisfactory.

THE DIRECTED VERDICT AND APPLICABILITY OF
STATE PROCEDURAL RULES IN FELA CASES:
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
Implicit in the scheme of concurrent enforcement of national legislative enactments by state and federal courts is the question of the
proper procedural rules to be observed in the state forum. A serious
contention has been that the state's interest in administering its own
judicial system is so significant that local rules of pleading and practice
must be applied even at the sacrifice of legitimate claims arising under
federal law.1 Adequate appraisal of the validity of this argument must
60. Marxists have long embraced the theory that concentration is an inevitable
result of the capitalistic system. See SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALIS-, AND
DEMOCRACY 34 (2d ed. 1947).
Today this Marxian theory has been augmented, strangely enough, by those who
contend that there exists an economic and technological necessity for bigness in today's
industry. See Charles E. Wilson, Big Business and Big ProgressGo Together (Privately
Printed Brochure 1949) ; DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 224 (1946).
1. The most important legal problem confronting our jurisprudential system is
that inherent in the co-existence of national and state governments. Solution of the
really significant social problems forced upon us by the interdependence of modern institutions requires a constant adjustment in this relationship. During the upheaval of
the 1930's this truism was mirrored in the controversy over the limits of federal power
under the commerce clause. Since this provision was found to be substantially co-extensive with national requirements, the problem is now focused in the extent of state power
to tax and to regulate economic activity. Yet the limits of federal authority are still
being probed with reference to the explosive issues of protection against state abuses of
the criminal processes and of the other numerous safeguards, embodied in the 14th
Amendment, against unjust state action.
Hardship resulting from arbitrary exercise of power by a strong central government provides the historical justification for our federal system; to allay the popular fear
of tyranny caused by such centralized authority, our Federal Constitution created
a national government with expressly limited powers. Nevertheless, as the United
States grew geographically and industrially the functions of the national government

NOTES
take into account the policy underlying the particular statute aid also
prior Supreme Court pronouncements concerning utilization of state
procedural rules. An examination of these factors in the context of
recent Federal Employers Liability Act 2 decisions suggests that this contention cannot be sustained.
Moreover, widespread criticism has been leveled at the Court for
too frequent review of FELA cases turning on mere assessment of the
evidence. Although close supervision of such litigation may have been
justified in the past, appreciation of the proper function of the Court
suggests the need for a re-examination of the propriety of such continued
surveillance.
-The FELA, enacted in 1908, conferred a right of actiofi upon
railway workers for injuries caused by the negligence of the railroad,
its agents and employees. Recovery under the Act was facilitated by
negation of the common law defenses of contributory negligence 3 arid
the fellow servant doctrine. Further indicating the obvious desire of
Congress to reduce obstacles to recovery by injured railroad employees,
amendments in 1910' and 1939- extended the right of action to the
deceased's personal representatives or next of kin and abolished assumption of risk.
necessarily increased. For as problems arose, demanding solutions of which the states
were incapable, the traditional concept of negative government was replaced by the
thesis that federal machinery must be used to meet undeniable national needs. Although acceptance of this view is now commonplace in many areas of our social and
economic life, the extension of government aid into new fields is meeting progressively
stronger opposition by those who view traditional state prerogatives with a jealous eye.
Unquestionably, as the matters to be resolved vary geographically in substance and
complexity, so must the solutions. Thus states' rights objections to some federal encroachment may be firmly based upon reason and experience. This, however, should
not obscure the possibility that a particular issue may best be decided by a uniform solution administered by a central authority. The controversy certainly should not be
further befogged by opposition on the grounds of as yet unrealized fears of the misuse
of power by the federal government.
Problems growing out of concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts to
enforce the FELA have presented one small feature of this controversy within the
vast panorama of federal and state power. But it is suggested that on the basis of a
realistic evaluation of opposink state and federal interests, this aspect of the larger
picture may be more properly termed a pseudo-federalism conflict. The state's interest
in preserving the autonomy of its court system fades into relative insignificance beside
the strong national policy expressed by FELA. No important state prerogative is
overridden when effective assertion of a federal right requires subordination of a
particular state procedural rule.
2. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-6 (1946).
3. The doctrine of comparative negligence was adopted so that contributory
negligence is still relevant to reduce damages.
4. 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. §§ 56, 59 (1946).
5. 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 54, 56, 60 (1946). The original Act
did abolish assumption of risk as a defense where the injury was due to violation
oi g safgy appliance statute.
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Despite the evident intent to liberalize recovery under the Act%
initially the Supreme Court strictly construed the facts necessary to
constitute a cause of action7 and even preserved the defense of contributory negligence, labelling it assumption of risk." Consonant with
other reversals in the philosophy of the Court, however, the pendulum
completed its full arc and the word "negligence" is no longer narrowly
defined.9 Indeed some Justices have asserted that recovery is presently
based upon strict liability'0 rather than fault. 1
Certainly a definite conflict exists within the Court over the grant
of certiorari in FELA cases turning on the sufficiency of the evidence
to go to the jury and over the applicability of state procedural rules
when it is sought to enforce the federal right in a state forum. Although
6. Some critics contend that Congress in establishing a federal cause of action
envisaged simply the abolition of the common law negligence defenses. An equally
tenable position is that Congress created a uniform right of action which contemplated that state rules of procedure interfering with effective assertion of such right
would be inapplicable. See Gavit, States' Rights and Federal Procedure,.25 IND. L.J. 1,
11 n.33 (1949). It is unwarranted to infer that Congress did not foresee the diverse
results which have actually occurred when state procedural rules have been applied.
To accommodate such consequences with an intent to establish uniform recovery is
impossible.
7. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. v. Saxon, 284 U.S1 458 (1932) (deceased was
running alongside the moving train with the purpose of boarding it. Plaintiff's theory
was that deceased stepped into a soft spot along the roadway and fell under the
train. Supporting evidence was the soft spot with a footprint therein, and blood
eight or ten feet west of the soft spot. There were no eye witnesses but the evidence
persuaded the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the cause of death
could only be "surmised."); C. & 0. R. v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 44 (1932). Compare
Pennsylvania R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 323, 339 (1932), where the Court said:
"..*where proven facts give equal support to each of two inconsistent inferences ...
neither of them being established, judgment, as a matter of law, must go against the
party upon whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of these inferences as against
the other, before he is entitled to recover," with Tennant v. Peoria "&P. U. R., 321
U.S. 29, 35 (1943): "It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to take the case away from the jury on a
theory that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences."
Compare New York C. R. v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486 (1929), with Lavender v. Kurn,
327 U.S. 645 (1945).
8. GELLHORN, VALIDITY OF FEDERAL ComPENsATIo
FOR TRANSPORTATION E"PLOYEES, 25 Am. LAB. LEG. Rav. 71 (1935).
9. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, .180 (1948) ; Lavender v. Kurn, 327
U.S. 645, 653 (1945) ; Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1929).'
10. Congress has had repeated opportunities to adopt a workmens' compensation
scheme of recovery for railroad workers. For tabulation of such bills introduced in
Congress see Pollack, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Work In-juries and Diseases, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 236, 271-72 (1950). At present, however, both the railroad
industry and labor unions are, for different reasons, opposed to adoption of this
legislation. When labor sentiment was favorable to this type of compensation for
industrial injuries, the railroads effectively sabotaged the enabling legislation. See 49
CONG, REc. 4547, 4562-3, 4673-5, 4676-7 (1910).
11. See, e. g., Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 76 (1948) ; Johnson v. U. S.,
333 U.S. 46, 55 (1947); Bailey v. Central Vt. R., 319 U.S. 350, 358 (1942).
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agreeing on the inadequacy of FELA as a device to impose upon the
railroad industry the personal injury risks incident to its operations,
Justices Black and Frankfurter represent two widely divergent ap12
proaches to these problems.

In FELA controversies, as in other areas of the law, Justice Black
has exhibited his great confidence in the propriety of jury trials. 13
Therefore, for him the question whether plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence to reach the jury is significant enough to merit Supreme Court
review. A conceivable explanation for this attitude is that the jury
usually favors the plaintiff in these railway negligence cases, 1 4 which
accords with Justice Black's predilections. 15 An equally plausible
answer is his desire to protect the jury system from judicial erosion.
This democratic iristitution, evolved through centuries of struggle against
arbitrary officialdom, should not be stripped of its traditional prerogatives. "' Whatever his motivation, he has adopted the position that the
"right to trial by jury is part and parcel of the remedy afforded
railroad workers under FELA. '1 7 Justice Frankfurter, on the other
hand, has frequently indicated that FELA cases concerning sufficiency of the evidence do not present any question necessitating issuance
12. The cases do not reveal Justice Black's attitude toward FELA, but presumably
he recognizes the deficiencies of the Act-at least his vigorous defense of the jury,
conspicuously favorable to plaintiffs, evidences his understanding of the importance
of this legislation to the railroad worker.- Mr. Justice Frankfurter has repeatedly
manifested awareness of the inefficacy of the Act. ". . . [T]he common law concept
of liability for negligence is archaic and unjust as a means of compensation for
injuries sustained by employees under modern industrial conditions. . . ." Tiller v.
Atlantic C. L. R., 318 U.S. 54, 71 (1943); Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. L, 338
U.S. 430, 438 (1949) ; Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 196 (1948). Despite this attitude
Justice Frankfurter has been caustically criticized for "... . his insistence on 'negligence'
being construed as a technical word of art requiring absolute proof of dereliction
by the railroad." Richter and Forer, FELA-A Real Compgnsatory Law for Railroad
Workers, 36 CoiuNxu L.Q. 203, 210 n.20 (1950).
13. See Galloway v. U.S., 319 U.S. 372, 297 (1943); Brady v. Southern R., 320
U.S. 476, 484 (1943); Tiller v. Atlantic C. L. R., 318 U.S. 54, 67-68 (1943); Blair v.
B. & 0. R., 323 U.S. 600, 602 (1944); FRANic, MR. JusTicE BLACK-THE MAN AND
His OPINIONS 117 (1949); WILLIAMS, HUGO L. BLAcK-A STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL
PRocEss 118 (1950).
14. Studies of the practical working of the jury system have revealed that juries
do favor the plaintiff. Where the dispute involves a worker and a large corporation,
the bias of the jury is probably even more pronounced. Although, in reality, justice
may thus be better served, no pious pronouncements that the jury can be expected to
accomplish its task impartially can obscure such prejudice. See Clark and Shulman,
ury Trial in Civil Cases, 38 YALE .J. 867 (1934).
15. Frank, op. cit. supra note 13.
16. For an interesting account of the trend toward strict judicial control of the
jury see Justice Black's dissent in Galloway v. U. S., 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943).
And for a discussion of methods of jury control resting in appellate courts see GREEN,
JUDGE Am JtmY 391 (1930).
17. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R., 72 Supt. Ct. 312, 315 (1951).
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of the writ of certiorari.1 8 He can perceive no "general principle requiring pronouncement"' 9 by the Court in the unique fact patterns of successive applications.
Manifestly, no single tribunal could possibly administer a judicial
hierarchy consisting of countless forums and numerous court systems if
every dissatisfied litigant were entitled to pursue his grievance ultimately
to the very apex of the judicial pyramid. Hence, it early became apparent
that the proper role of the Supreme Court must be restricted to abstract
resolution of the many crucial problems confronting the federal system;
assuring just solution of particular controversies must, of necessity, be
relegated to the lower courts. 20 An outgrowth of this realization was the
institution of statutory certiorari jurisdiction, conferring on the Supreme
Court broad discretion to select those cases which it wbuld review.
Basic to the conflict over the grant of certiorari in FELA sufficiency
of the evidence cases are opposing views as to what evidence should be
considered by the judge when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict.
It is fundamental that a plaintiff must introduce substantial evidence in
order to present a case for the jury. 2' But should the judge view only
plaintiff's evidence, or should all the evidence in the case figure in his
determination whether there is an issue of fact for the jury? Those
who favor the former rule contend that for the trial judge to evaluate
18. Moore v. C. & 0. R., 340 U.S. 573, 578 (1950); Affolder v. New York
C. & St. L. R., 339 U.S. 96, 101 (1949); Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. R., 338 U.S.
430, 439 (1949); Reynolds v. Atlantic C. L. R., 336 U.S. 207, 209 (1948); Wilkerson
v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 66-67 (1948) ; Justice Frankfurter held a similar view before
he was appointed to the Court. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, BusINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT 213 (1927); Frankfurter and Landis, The Judiciary Act of 1925, 32 HARv. L.
REV. 18 (1928). The backgrounds of Justices Black and Frankfurter may reveal some
basis for their divergent views. Justice Black was a noted plaintiffs' lawyer in
Alabama-it is to be expected that his previous experience would affect his view of
the importance of the jury trial. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, reflects his
training and discipline as a legal scholar who was not, perhaps, practically familiar
with the personal hardship of litigants in trial courts. Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter's opposition to the liberal view recently prevalent on the Court may be
grounded in his outspoken belief that the FELA is a "cruel survival of a by-gone era"
and that strict construction of negligence requirements is.the best method of attaining
reform.
19. Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. R., 338 U.S. 431, 438 (1949).
20. See, e. g., Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 67 (1948) ; Bailey v. Central
Vt. R. 319 U.S. 350, 358 (1943) ; Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 500, 503 (1939) ;
Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159 (1922) ; Hughes, Address before American
Law Institute 1934, 20 A.B.A.J. 341 (1934).
21. Western & A. R. v. Hughes, 278 U.S. 496 (1928) (state courts must apply
federal rule requiring substantial evidence for submission of case to jury); L. & N.
R. v. Reverman's Adm'r, 228 Ky. 500, 15 S.W.2d 300 (1929). That this was not
clearly understood by some state courts even as late as 1940 may indicate a reason for
the frequent grants of certiorari. See Kurn v. Weaver, 25 Tenn. App. 556, 161 S.W.
2d 1005 (1940); Hoogbruin v. Atchison T. & S. F. R., 297 Pac. 61 (Cal. App. 1931).

NOTES
all the evidence in a case constitutes usurpation of the jury's function
of resolving contradictory evidence and weighing the credibility of
witnesses. 22 The latter view finds support in the recognition that whether
there actually is a factual issue for jury determination depends necessarily upon the evidence presented by both parties to a controversy.
Moreover, it must be realistically conceded, a judge who has heard all
the evidence will find it virtually impossible to consider only plaintiff's
version of the case in ruling on the sufficiency question.
Any attempt to solve the current certiorari dispute must be predicated upon an understanding of the Court's vacillation concerning the
proper rule for direction of a verdict. Prior to 1943, the settled federal
rule required the judge to consider both plaintiff's and defendant's evidence. 2 3 In that year the Court reiterated this position in a five
to four decision. 24 Since the assent of only four justices is required to
grant certiorari, the status of the rule was seriously weakened. As a
consequence of this changed alignment on the Court, certiorari was
frequently granted in the period from 1943 to 1948; and the cases seem
to manifest, without specifically delineating a clear standard, an increas22. Justice Douglas,- concurring in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1948),
compiled a list of all applications for certiorari from the 1943 term to the 1948 term
classified according to the disposition of each case. Id. at 71-74. One of the conclusions he drew from an analysis of these cases was that, "The criterion governing
the exercise of our discretion in granting or denying certiorari is not who loses below
but whether the jury function in passing on disputed questions of fact and in
drawing inferences from proven facts has been respected." Id. at 70-71. See McBaine,
Trial Practice; Directed Verdict; Federal Rule, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 454 (1943); Blume,
The Directed Verdict, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 555 (1950).
23. The cases do not indicate any conflict over the rule. Professor McBaine
seemed to be incorrect in saying that the federal rule called for consideration of only
plaintiff's evidence. See McBaine, supra note 22. The sudden prominence of the dispute
over the proper rule may be explained partially by justice Black's appearance on the
Court since he has been described as ".

.

. the first member of the Supreme Court

in a hundred years to have a really zealous desire to preserve that system [the jury]."
The later
FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLAcK-THE MAN AND His OpiNioNs 117 (1949).
appointments of Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge added considerable influence
to Justice Black's attempts to formulate a new rule.
24. Brady v. Southern R., 320 U.S. 476 (1943). The rule enunciated by Justice
Reed was an attempt to evade the objection of usurption of the jury functions: "When
evidence is such that without weighing credibility of witnesses there can be but one
reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, the court should determine the proceeding by
a non-suit, directed verdict, or otherwise practicable procedure without submission
to the jury, or by judgment notwithstanding the verdict." Id. at 279-80 (emphasis
added). Justice Black, before stating his disagreement over the proper rule, said:
"Twelve North Carolina citizens who heard many witnesses and saw many exhibits
found on their oaths that the railroad's employees were negligent. The local trial judge
sustained their finding. Four members of this Court agree with the local trial judge
that the jury's conclusion was reasonable. Nevertheless five members of the Court
purport to weigh all the evidence offered by both parties to the suit, and hold the
conclusion unreasonable. Truly, appellate review of jury verdicts by application of
a supposed norm of reasonableness gives rise to puzzling results." Id. at 484-85.

542
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ing solicitude for the rule favoring submission. 25 Finally, in Wilkerson
v. McCarthy,26 Justice Black, speaking for the majority, announced that
"it is the established rule that in passing upon whether there is sufficient
evidence to submit an issue to the jury we need only look to the evidence
and reasonable inferences which tend to support the case of a litigant
against whom a peremptory instruction has been given."' 27 Unfortunately the permanency of this rule likewise is subject to doubt, due to
a peculiar division on the Court.28 This uncertainty was compounded
in a 1950 decision in which the Court apparently reviewed all the evi29
dence, yet failed to repudiate the recently established rule.
Clearly the Supreme Court has failed to enunciate any guide adequate to dispel the confusion surrounding this issue and to supply a
criterion of sufficient particularity that state judges can follow with
assurance. In addition, the uncertain cleavage within the Court in the
Wilkerson case presents strong inducement to unsuccessful defendants
to besiege the Court with applications for certiorari. 30
It may be conceded, perhaps, that the Court's sustained preoccupation with the sufficiency question in FELA cases is unwarranted in light
of the numerous other urgent matters demanding judicial solution. 3'
25. See Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. R., 321 U.S. 29 (1943); Lavender v. Kurn,
327 U.S. 645 (1945); Myers v. Reading R., 331 U.S. 477 (1946); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 46 (1947) (case brought under Jones Act, which incorporates the
FELA standards of liability). See Note, 44 ILL. L. REv. 854 (1950).
26. 336 U.S. 53 (1948).
27. Id. at 57. With the exception of the- cases listed in note 25 supra, past
decisions do not seem to justify use of "established." However, Justice Black could as
well have meant it is now the established rule.
28. Two justices dissented from the majority opinion but Justice Frankfurter,
concurring in an opinion in which Justice Burton joined, disagreed as to the proper
rule. Since Justice Burton also joined in the majority opinion, the numerical division
on the Court as to the announced rule was uncertain.
29. Moore v. C. & 0. R., 340 U.S. 573 (1950). Plaintiff contended that decedent
fell while riding on the tender and was killed because the engineer negligently made
a sudden stop. The engineer testified, as plaintiff's witness, that the sudden stop was
made after decedent fell. The jury, evidently disbelieving the engineer, found for the
plaintiff, but the district court sustained the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. The Supreme Court, in affirming, said that for the jury to infer that the
train stopped for no purpose and that decedent fell because the train stopped was
"speculation run riot." Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting, thought that this was
a "totally unwarranted substitution of a court's view of evidence for that of a jury."
Compare Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1945).
30. Since two of the Justices in the Wilkerson majority are no longer on the
Court, the change in personnel increases the possibility of a reversion to the former
rule.
31. No matter what explanation may be proffered by the Court, basically the
review is limited to a study of the facts to see whether there could be any reasonable
basis for a jury verdict that defendant was negligent. Yet it is pertinent to recognize,
as did Justice Frankfurter, that "perhaps no field of law comes closer to the lives of
so many families in this country than does the law of negligence imbedded as it is
[in] the FELA." Tiller v. Atlantic C. L. R., 318 U.S. 54, 73 (1943). For a
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But the muddled status of the rule suggests that the Court should
formulate a definitive and authoritative standard before relinquishing
its constant supervision of this area. Once such action is taken, primary
reliance must be placed in the state tribunals, to follow scrupulously the
leadership of the Court. This fundamental prerequisite to the successful
functioning of our judicial system precludes constant review merely
because an accepted doctrine has been incorrectly applied. Particularly
is this true with reference to the law of negligence, where application
of general principles is difficult because of the bewildering array. of
potential fact situations. Unjust results may be reached not because
the wrong rule was applied but because the facts were interpreted
incorrectly. Only where frequent disregard for the rule threatens to
subvert its basic policy is judicial intervention justifiable.
Justice Black's perspective with regard to the applicability of state
procedural rules is as unequivocal as his view on the jury question.
Plaintiff may elect to pursue, in a state court, a cause of action conferred
by the FELA; in this event, federal substantive law must be followed
while the state ordinarily may utilize its own rules of pleading and practice.3 2 But local rules of practice must not interfere with a party's
assertion of his federally created right. 33 And for Justice Black preservation of comity between federal and state judicial systems is overshadowed
by the need to implement the policy underlying the federal act,3 4 i.e.,
creation of a uniform right of action for all railroad workers and
facilitation of recovery through relaxation of common law negligence
principles. In light of the current liberal attitude toward the degree of
proof necessary to substantiate a cause of action based on negligence,
a similar approach to technical rules of pleading and practice is warranted.
discussion of the significance of cases the Court does not review, see Harper and

Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term--An Appraisal of
Certiorari, 99 U. of FA. L. REv. 293 (1950)
32. In essence the problem is how much of its procedure the state may applythis is the specific pseudo-federalism problem which is a part of the general controversy discussed in note 1 supra.
33. Brown v. Western R., 338 U.S. 294 (1949); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 317 U.S. 239'(1942); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923).
34. The governing consideration was plainly articulated by Justice Black in
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 244 (1942): "If by its practice the
state courts were permitted substantially to alter the rights of either litigant, as those
rights were established in federal law, the remedy afforded by the state would not
enforce, but actually deny, federal rights which Congress, by providing alternative
remedies, intended to make not less, but more secure." In Brown v. Western R., 338
U.S. 294 (1949), although Justice Black used language indicating that the problem
,vas susceptible of solution within the procedure-substance dichotomy, the Court
actually held that the Georgia rule construing the pleading strictly against the pleader

delrived the plaintiff of his right to trial by jury.
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Justice Frankfurter adheres to a radically different concept of the
import of dual sovereignty, ascribing inordinate. consequence to the
problem of federalism implicit in the grant of concurrent jurisdiction
under FELA.3 5 To him the mere fact that a state tribunal is enforcing
a right created by federal law does not forestall resort to the procedure
used in similar cases arising under state law. 36 Justice Frankfurter has
indicated that he would address the problem of determining how much
of the state practice can be retained in FELA litigation in essentially
the same manner that the federal courts today approach the Erie-Tompkins choice of law question. 8 7 In diversity cases, state procedural rules
will be applied in a federal forum if failure to do so would materially
affect the outcome. 38 That this cannot be the parallel Justice Frankfurter envisages is conclusively demonstrated in the very decision in
which he first suggested the analogy. For there he condoned use of a
state rule of pleading in a Georgia FELA proceeding, although the result
thus achieved was manifestly inconsistent with the disposition which
would have been reached by a federal district court. 9
35. Justice Frankfurter's view is that the state has complete control of its judicial
system subject only to the privileges and immunities- clause, and that Congress must
have contemplated such when it conferred concurrent jurisdiction on state courts.
For a full statement of his' conception of this federal-state relationship, see Brown v.
Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 (1943).
36. See Brown v. Western R., 338 U.S. 294, 300 (1949); Miles v. Illinois C. R.,
315 U.S. 698, 712 (1941). "The history of Congressional legislation regulating not
only interstate commerce as such but also activities intertwined with it, justify the
generalization that, when the Federal Government takes over such local radiations in
the vast network of our national economic enterprise and thereby radically readjusts
the balance of state and national authority, those charged with the duty of legislating
are reasonably explicit and do not entrust its attainment to that restrospective expansion
of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation." Frankfurter,
Reading of Statutes, 47 COL. L. REV. 527, 540 (1947). Justice Frankfurter reasons
that since an FELA plaintiff could have brought his action in a federal court rather
than the state forum, he should not be heard to complain of the imposition of state
procedural requirements even though a possibly meritorious claim may be defeated. The
answer to this contention was given long ago by Justice Black: "The constant objective
of legislation and jurisprudence is to assure litigants full protection for all substantive
rights intended to be afforded them by the jurisdiction in which the right itself
originates. Not so long ago we sought to achieve this result with respect to enforcement
in the federal court of rights created or governed by state law. . . . [Citing Erie v.
Tompkins]. So here, in trying this case the state was bound to proceed in such a
manner that all substantial rights of the parties under controlling federal law would
See
be protected." Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942).
note 35 supra.
37. Brown v. Western R., 338 U.S. 294, 301 (1949).
38. The converse of this rule is demonstrably true in FELA cases, ie., where
the state rule materially affects the outcome of an FELA case in a state forum, it
may not be applied. Compare Ragan v. Merchants Transfer and Warehouse Co., 336
U.S. 917 (1949), with Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945), 325 U.S. 77 (1945),
and compare Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), with Central Vt R. v. White,
238 U.S. 507 (1914).
39. In the Brown case, the plaintiff's dismissal for failure to allege his cause of
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The similarity he apparently perceives lies in the functional characterization of "substance" and "procedure", i.e., in terms of the end
to be achieved, which has typified the judicial process in recent ErieTompkins controversies. While no one will challenge this laudable
attempt to avoid the tyranny of labels long dominating procedure-substance disputes, the ultimate goal in terms of which Justice Frankfurter
would place a rule of pleading and practice in one category or the other
merits critical study.
His excessive emphasis of the federalism question and facile deference to the inviolability of state procedure in the local forum may well
subvert fundamental social policies permeating the FELA. 40 Paradoxically, these policies may best be achieved, perhaps, by a thoroughgoing
adaptation of the Erie-Tompkins principle to FELA litigation, rather
than by the mere imitation, suggested by Justice Frankfurter, of a
familiar method of classification. If the determinative criterion in state
FELA litigation were achievement of a result identical with that which
the federal forum would reach on the same facts, implementation of
desired uniformity and facilitation of recovery would be attained. 41
A case which casts new light upon the permissible limits of state
control over the function of the jury where.a federal right is invoked
in a state court is Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R., 4 2 decided
last term. Although under Ohio practice fraud in a negligence action
is an equitable issue, the jury found for the plaintiff on the question of
alleged deception in procurement of a release. Nevertheless, the trial
judge rendered judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding that plaintiff was guilty of "supine negligence" in signing the release without
reading it. Following affirmance by the Ohio Supreme Court, 43 the
action with sufficient particularity could not have occurred in a federal court where
pleadings are to be construed very liberally. If the correct Erie approach had been
utilized, the result, so far as maintaining the action, would have been different.
40. Thus the end to be achieved is, in Justice Frankfurter's conception, the preservation of state control over local tribunals. It is with this goal in mind that he
utilizes the substance-procedure dichotomy. In face of the previously declared intent
of Congress to make recovery uniform throughout the country, his argument is

unsound. See Gavit, States' Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1, 11 n.33
(1949), for the contention that Congress must have intended the Supreme Court to
resolve the procedural conflicts inherent in the Act.
41. Past decisions have failed to formulate any precise criterion by which state

courts could decide whether or not a particular procedural rule is applicable. Certainly, putting the standard in terms of "unreasonable obstructions" or "discriminatory
against the federal cause of action" provides no certainty for the courts or future
litigants. See Douglas v. N. H. & H. R, 279 U.S. 377 (1928); Davis v. Wechsler,
263 U.S. 22 (1923). Forthright assertion of the suggested standard would furnish
a reliable guide to lower courts.
42. 72 Sup. Ct. 312 (1951).
43. 155 Ohio St. 185, 98 N.E.2d 301 (1951).
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decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court. In a five
to four opinion, the Court regarded the withdrawal of this matter from
44

the jury as error.

Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the result, dissented from the reasoning of the majority on three grounds: (1) the controlling precedent
is Minneapolis & St. L. R. v. Bombolis,4 5 which entitled the Ohio court
to follow its own procedure, leaving the fraud issue to the judge; (2)
the Court has covertly repudiated the Bomboli, case; (3) the ultimate result is to subject state tribunals to a hybridization of state and
federal procedure. 46
Minneapolis & St. L. R. v. Bombolis determined that Minnesota
could authorize a non-unanimous verdict without Constitutional impediment, since the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury did not apply
to state courts engaged in enforcing federal rights. However, as Justice
Black points out in the Dice case, Ohio has not attempted to abolish the
jury in negligence cases 4'7 nor has it attempted to provide for a nonunanimous verdict. The Court merely asserted that the Act did not
permit Ohio to remove certain issues of fact from the jury's consideration. Examination of the subsequent history of Bombolis and the rationale underlying the case reveal no support for Justice Frankfurter's
48
exaggerated estimate of its ramifications.
Presumably a state may withdraw all issues from the jury simply
by abolishing it.4 9 But if the state chooses to provide a jury as the
44. The minority concurred in the result but dissented from the grounds of the
majority opinion.
45. 241 U.S. 211 (1915).
46. Justice Frankfurter stated the significance of these conclusions: "We have
put the questions squarely because they seem to be precisely what will be roused in
the minds of lawyers properly pressing their clients' interests and in the minds of
trial and appellate judges called upon to apply this Court's opinion." 72 Sup. Ct.
512, 318 (1951).
47. The point Justice Black was suggesting is that Bombolis would be a valid
precedent if Ohio had done away with the jury as the trier of fact in negligence
cases.
48. It surely would not be inconsistent to require that all issues of fact be tried
-by a jury permitted under state law to render a non-unanimous verdict.
49. Apparently no Federal -Constitutional obstacle would prevent such action since
Bombolis does stand for this proposition. However, the contention may be advanced
that the right to jury trial of all fact issues in FELA litigation is guaranteed by the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. This argument is in no way
weakened by acceptance of the frequently reiterated proposition that the Seventh
Amendment does not require trial by jury in state courts. The reasoning would take
the following form: if the state provides a forum for its own negligence cases, it is
Constitutionally required to likewise provide for state enforcement of federal rights
established by statutes conferring concurrent jurisdiction on state and federal tribunals.
See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1946). As has been emphasized, page 547 infra, jury
trial is "part and parcel" of the federal right under the FELA. (As meant here, the
right to jury trial is that of having a jury as the trier of fact. This is not the sense
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trier of fact, Bailey v. Central Vt. R., 50 decided since Bombolis, establishes the requirement that all questions of fact must be submitted to it.
If this interpretation is not correct then the language of the Bailey case
that "the right to trial by jury is part and parcel of the remedy afforded
railroad workers under FELA" is meaningless. 51 Such a ruling is inconsistent with the extension of the Bombolis reasoning espdused by Mr.
justice Frankfurter in his dissent.
Although Justice Frankfurter asserts that Bombolis has "often been
cited by this Court but never questioned" 52 the fact is that he himself
has referred to it in two dissenting opinions in FELA cases5 3 and in
two dissents54 and one concurrence5 5 in other contexts. And except
for those decisions directly involving a non-unanimous verdict, 5 6 it has
been mentioned but four other times in FELA opinions. 57 Indeed the
in which the word is used in the Bailey or Dice cases). Hence, provision of adequate
state machinery for enforcement of the "entire" federal right entails jury consideration
of all factual issues. Consequently, since all states have established court systems,
and are required to observe the supreme law of the land, jury trial in FELA cases
assumes Constitutional stature.
50. 319 U.S. 350 (1943) (Vermont Supreme Court had reversed a jury verdict
for plaintiff).
51. The holding quoted above was taken from a case which arose from a federal
district court where the Seventh Amendment did apply. Jacobs v. New York, 315 U.S.
752 (1941). Although Justice Roberts wrote a critical separate opinion in the Bailey
case, in which Justice Frankfurter joined, see note 20 supra, no objection was made
to the holding.
52. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R., 72 Sup. Ct. 312, 316 (1951).
53. Brown v. Western IL, 338 U.S. 294, 300 (1949) (reversing state rule of
construing pleading strictly against the pleader); Miles v. Illinois C. R., 315 U.S.
698, 709 (1941) (state court was not permitted under FELA to enjoin a citizen from
prosecuting a suit in another state on the grounds that the latter suit was unjust and
inequitable).
54. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm., 327 U.S. 573, 581 (1945)
(held federal district court in Utah not a "court of competent j'urisdiction" within
meaning of those words in a state statute granting consent to be sued for fiscal claims
in such courts); Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448, 460 (1942) (dissenting
from holding that plaintiff could, after removal of a simple contract action from a
state court, amend his complaint to state a new cause of action under § 4 of the
Clayton Act. Amendment was allowed even though venue was improper, since such
action could be brought only where defendant resides, or is found or has an agent,
and here defendant was not a resident and had not been found in the jurisdiction in
so far as the new cause of action was concerned).
55. Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 190, 191 (1943) (dissenting from holding that power
to fix fees of attorneys representing bankrupt estate rests exclusively in federal
bankruptcy court so that state court was precluded from doing so).
56. Minneapolis and St. L. R. v. Winters, 242 U.S. 353 (1916); St. Louis & S. F.
R. v. Brown, 241 U.S. 223 (1915); C. & 0. R v. Carnahan, 241 U.S. 241 (1915);
L. & N. R. v. Stewart, 241 U.S. 261 (1915) ; C. & 0. R. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1915);
C.& 0.R. v.Gainey,241 U.S.494 (1915).
57. Brady v.Southern R., 320 U.S. 476 (1943) (state need not provide in FELA
cases any trial by jury according to the requirements of the Seventh Amendment);
Lee v. Central Ga. R., 252 U.S. 109 (1920) (joinder of causes of action and joinder
of parties governed by state law); Dickinson v. Stiles, 246 U.S. 631 (1917) (upheld
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facts suggest that any vitality retained by Bombolis as precedent is
directly attributable to Justice Frankfurter. This conclusion is strengthened by the Court's manifest disregard of the proposition which
Bombolis represents to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, that the states may apply
their own procedural rules in FELA cases 5 s Never has it been cited until
now with reference to the functions of court and jury in this area of
concurrent jurisdiction.5 9
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. does not imply that the
Seventh Amendment now constitutes a restriction upon state courts in
FELA cases; hence Bombolis is not overruled. Clearly the decision does
forestall an expansion of the rule to negate federal control of any jury
function. Dice is but a logical extension of Bailey v. Central Vt. R.,
which should have established the proposition that control of state courts
and jurors is not a matter of exclusively local concern. Where the state
provides for trial by jury, it now seems clear that the federal statute
requires that all factual issues having sufficient evidentiary basis go
to the jury. 0
As a result of the Dice case, it is true that the factual issues tried by
the judge in ordinary negligence controversies must now be handled
differently by the state courts in FELA litigation. The resulting hybridistate statute giving attorneys a lien upon a cause of action); C. & 0. R. v. Atley,
241 U.S. 310 (1915) (preparation of instructions a matter of state law).
58. See notes 52, 53, 54 supra. Bombolis has been cited favorably to support the
general proposition that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts
over suits relating to the regulation of interstate commerce, Grubb v. Public Utilities
Comm., 281 U.S. 470 (1929), and that state courts may not refuse to enforce a right
arising from federal law " . . . because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom
on the part of Congress.. . ." Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 391, 393 (1946). More specifically,
Bombolis has been cited to support Missouri procedure of permitting attachment
without personal service on defendant even though such procedure would not be proper
in a federal court, Missouri v. St. Louis, B. & M. B. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924),
and to uphold a state's power to determine venue of its own courts in enforcing the
Jones Act, Bainbridge v. Merchants & M. Transfer Co., 287 U.S. 278 (1932).
59. Non-FELA cases citing Bonbolis as to functions of court and jury: Wagner
Electric Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226 (1922) (if directed verdict deprives litigant of
right to trial by jury in a state court this is not a denial of due process of law
under the Federal Constitution); Chicago, R. I. & P. P. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54 (1919)
(state may provide that defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
are questions of fact and must always go to the jury) ; St. Louis & Kansas City Land
Co. v. Kansas City, 241 U.S. 419 (1915) (effect of jury verdict in an original assessment proceeding on later assessment in a supplemental proceeding is a matter of
state law. Despite defendant's nebulous contention to the contrary, it was determined
that the Seventh Amendment does noi require a different result).'
60. To give this abstract "right" a meaning, one should visualize the consequence
of removing from jury consideration every issue of fact but one. Clearly, in such an
event there is realistically no jury trial. Conversely, the "right" does have meaning
if all issues must go to the jury. Therefore, existence of the right is inconsistent with
state power to determine the issues for jury decision.
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zation is not a recent innovation; numerous Supreme Court decisions 61
since 1908 have ruled that various rules of state procedure are not
applicable under the Act. But the Dice holding can only lead to increased
certainty, since it is not difficult for trial judge and counsel to perceive
that the state may no longer assign trial of certain facts to the judge
and others to the jury in FELA cases. Any confusion engendered by
the remote potentialities of this case is purely speculative.
While no single opinion lends credence to this theory, the composite
perspective emerging out of the FELA decisions seems to bear a marked
resemblance to the Erie-Tompkins uniformity principle. 62 Unequivocal
articulation of this standard in the FELA area would create a workable
rule promoting achievement of a delicate balance between flexibility and
certainty. Such a criterion admittedly would require application of federal procedure in the state courts whenever failure to. do so might
produce disparity of result depending upon the forum. 63 But acquiescence
in local control over the procedural matters not thus removed from the
orbit of state influence constitutes ample deference to the relatively
insignificant state prerogatives involved. The proposed approach would
achieve a judicious subordination of states' rights to the advancement of
the vital policies underlying the Act.
61. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945), 325 U.S. 77 (1945) (whether or
not an action is commenced in a state court within meaning of § 6 of the FELA is a
matter of federal law) ; C. & 0. R. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1915) (measure of damages
is inseparably connected with the right of action and must be settled according to
federal law) ; Central Vt. R v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1914) (burden of proof in FELA
cases is not subject to control by states).
62. This, perhaps, is the ultimate implication of the Dice case although it is
nowhere articulated clearly. If any criticism were to be made of the Court in these
FELA procedural cases, it is that the Erie principle of uniformity discussed here has
not been made clearly applicable to state FELA litigation. Justce Black, in Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack, 317 U.S. 239 (1942), cited by him in his Dice opinion, asserted
in a dicta the same view here set forth. The decision actually was based on the
requirement that the state courts must apply admiralty law, under which burden of
proof was on defendant to substantiate the validity of a release. Yet Justice Black
recognized that the Jones Act, as based upon the FELA, required a uniform application
and that this "extends to the type, of proof necessary for judgment." Id. at 244.
See notes 35 and 37 supra. Similarly, in the Dice case uniform application of the
Act extends to the issues to be tried by the jury. Although the opinion in the MooreMfcCormack case indicated that the Court would apply the same rule to releases in
FELA cases, the Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, refused to do so! Callen v. Penn. R.,
332 U.S. 625 (1947).
63. In addition to supplying a standard of certainty for the guidance of state
courts, see note 41 supra, the suggested criterion would furnish a sounder basis for
the grant of certiorari than the "unreasonable obstruction" or "discriminatory" theories,
although the latter would still be utilized. See Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950)
(upheld Missouri forum non conveniens doctrine as not being discriminatory against
non-citizens).

